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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JUDITH H. DIENES and
DIANNE D. McMAIN,
Plain,ti"ffs and Appella!nts,
-vs.SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Washington
corporation,
DPf Pndant and Respondent.

!

)

Case
No.11048

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
I
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE

This is a suit to recover $10,000 from the defendant insurance company for a double-indemnity life
insurance risk policy.
II
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT

.T udgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant-respondent and against the plaintiffs-appellants "no
eause of action" was entered on .Tune 15, 1967.
1

III
RELIEF BEING SOUGHT ON APPgAL
Appellants are asking the Supreme Court to reverse
the lower court by sending the matter hack for a new
trial, with direction to the lower court to modify its instructions to the jury. The jury should be instructed that
plaintiff is entitled to recover without being required to
prove that the death of the insured resulted solely from
external injuries suffered in the auto accident. Appellants contend their requested instruction No. 19 is a
correct interpretation of the insurance policy language
involved and of the law of Utah.

v

MATERIAL FACTS
The life of Louis S. DiEnes, the husband and father
of the appellants, was insured by respondent for $10,000
by an accidental death and dismemberment policy. (Exhibit 1-P, Complaint and Answer R-1 and R-3.) Appellants submitted proof of death in the form of a certified copy of "Certificate of Dea.th" of Louis S. DiEnes,
and made demand on respondent for the payment of the
$10,000 accidental death and dismemberment benefits,
which respondent refused to pay. (Complaint and Answer R-1 and R-3.) This lawsuit by appellants was filed
to compei respondent to pay the $10,000.
The policy language with which we are concerned
reads as follows :
"ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT
BENEFITS - Subject to the Pxclm;ion provision, if
2

any employee, while insured by this policy and
prior to retirement, sustains bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, and as a result thereof, suffers
within 90 days one of the following losses, Lifeco
Insurance Company of America will pay the applicable amount specified in the Schedule of Insurance for Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance, or one-half such amount, as indicated:
1. For loss of life, the full amount'';

•

•

'' ExcLusrnNs - No Benefits under this Accidental Death and Dismemberment provision shall
be paid for accidental death or dismemberment
caused by:

1. Disease or bodily or mental infirmity, or
medical or surgical treatment thereof, ptomaine
or bacterial infection (except infections occurring
through an accidental cut or wound); or"

•

•

It was stipulated that the name of the company in
the policy, to-wit, "Lifeco," had been amended to
"Safeco." (R-67)

On the morning of August 4, 1965, Mr. Louis S. DiEnes was involved in an automobile accident. He was
injured and after some delay at the accident scene he
was taken to the hospital (R-71). He had a through
and through laceration to his nose, abrasions on both
knees, and hit his stomach fairly hard. (Emergency Record Exhibit 3-d.) Mr. DiEnes was a high-keyed individual, very tense, and very significantly upset over the
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happening of the accident (R-81). He was given an electrocardiogram and prepared for corrective nose surgery
(R-81). The electrocardiogram showed no substantial
changes from the previous one of some two months earlier (R-82).
Mr. DiEnes had suffered a myocardial infarction in
1962, due to arteriosclerotic heart disease; he had been
admitted to the hospital for coronary insufficiency in
June, 1965; the autopsy performed after his death
showed an extreme degree of coronary sclerosis with
marked narrowing of the lumen due to both sclerosis
and thrombosis; Mr. DiEnes had responded well to medication a.nd therapy following his previous two admissions
to the hospital in March, 1962, and .June of 1965; however, at approximately 1 :10 a.m. on August 5, he passed
away (R-86, 87 and Exhibit 2-P). The death certificate
which was completed by Dr. Smith, his own physician
(who participated in the autopsy) listed the immediate
cause of death as
(a) Acute coronary insufficiency
(h) Due to recent auto accident
( c) Due to severe artereiosclfrotic heart disease (underlying cause listed last)
(Exhibit 2-P admitted in evidence R-86 although not
stamped ''admitted'' by clerk.)
Dr. Smith testified that the last time he saw Mr. DiEnes alive he was much concerned about how keyed-up
and tense and disturbed he was. .Mr. DiEnes wanted to
go home, hut because of his extreme tension, Dr. Smith
insisted that he stay in the hospital (R.-84).
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Dr. Smith testified at the trial that he believed that
the automobile accident was a direct contributing factor
to Mr. DiEnes' final heart attack (R-87). When he was
asked to explain this statement, Dr. Smith testified:
"It has been proved that he had a serious
heart disease prior to the accident. He was in
the hospital as a direct result of the accident. The
accident itself, seemingly, was - to an ordinary
individual - of minor consequences; but, as far
as Mr. DiEnes was concerned with the type of
medical problem that we were treating him for,
the accident was definitely the final contributing
factor to his death." (R-87)

On cross-examination, Dr. Smith testified that in Mr.
DiEnes' condition any episode of serious anxiety could
very likely have caused him to expire (R-97).
On redirect examination, Dr. Smith testified that
anxiety was not good for Mr. DiEnes (R-97). When
asked whether he had an opinion, medically, as to what
caused Mr. DiEnes' anxiety on August 4, Dr. Smith responded, "\Vell, it was definitely a result of the auto
arcident." (R-98)
Dr. Carlquist, the pathologist who performed the
autopsy on Mr. DiEnes, testified at length as to the seriousness of Mr. DiEnes' heart problems and circulation
problems (R-104, 110). He described them as acute,
marked, with the lumen in the left aorta almost completely clotted and only a tiny opening that would represent
R bout fi,·e percent of the former total opening; the heart
muscle was also in a state of degeneration (R-106, 108).
5

Dr. Carlquist testified that in his opinion the cause
of Mr. DiEnes' death was his severe cardiac damage, severe heart disease (R-114, 115).
Nevertheless, Dr. Carlquist did not have an opinion
whether Mr. DiEnes' death occurred as a result of the
external violent and accidental bodily injuries suffered
by Mr. DiEnes in the August 4 automobile accident
(R-114). When pressed on recross-examination, Dr. Carlquist testified as follows:
Q. "Doctor, do you exclude, completely, from this
consideration the fact of the automobile accident?
A. No, sir; I have no way of tying it to-together
-as far as my autopsy was concerned.
Q. Do you take the position that the automobile
accident is wholly inconsequential, insofar as
his death is concerned1
A. No, I don't- didn't mean to imply that - by
my "yes" or "no" answers. I mean, I simply
meant to imply I don't know what relationship
was beitween the accident and his death.
Q. Do you exclude the accident as a causative
factor?
A. No."

Appellants and respondent differed in the lower
court as to the construction of the policy. The court declined to take sides by refusing to instruct the jury on
the legal theory of either counsel. Instead, the court instructed the jury in the language of the policy. The court
further instructed appellants' counsel that he would not
permit him to argue tha:t the insuring agreement was am6

bignous, and in argument to the jnry, counsel would be
re~tricted to the precise language of the court's instruction No. 15 (R-139, 140). Appellants' counsel was denied
permission to present to the jury his construction of the
policy language as reflected in appe1lants' proposed instruction No. 19 (R-60 and R-137, 138).
In summation to the jury, respondent's counsel read
the court's instruction No. 15 and stated to the jury that
plaintiffs could not recover unless they had proved that
the death of DiEnes resulted solely from injuries effected
through external, violent and accidental means (R-140).
Appellants interrupted argument at this point and made
objection to the court (R-140).
A timely motion for new trial was filed by appellant::>, supported by an affidavit of counsel. Respondent's
counsel also filed an affidavit. We quote in full the motion and both affidavits as the best possible resume of the
differences between appellants and the lower court:
"MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Civil No. 163708
Plaintiffs move the court to set aside the verdict of the jury returned herein on June 15, 1967,
and to grant a new trial because of errors of law
as follows:
1. The Court erred in refusing to give to the
jury plaintiffs' requested instructions numbered
16, 17, 18 and particularly instruction number 19.
2. The Court erred in instructing the jury by
giYing its instruction numbered 15 for the reason
and on the ground that instruction number 15
does not determinr the law of this case and leaves
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it up to the jury to determine the law, and for
the further reason that instruction number 15
does not recite that the bodily injuries suffered
by Mr. DiEnes were affected solely through external, violent and accidental means, a. fact which
wa.s not in dispute, and which plaintiffs specifically requested in chambers before the Court gave
its instructions to the jury.
3. The Court erred in refusing to determine
the law of the case and instruct the jury thereon,
the Court having stated in chambers that it would
remain neutral with respect to the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant on the construction of ,the language of the policy.
4. Counsel for the defendant conducted himself improperly in arguing to the jury that in order for plaintiffs to recover they had to prove that
the death of decedent was solely the result of
injuries affected through external, violent and
accidental means and the Court did not admonish
counsel or instruct the jury to disregard such
statements.
5. The Court erred in advising counsel for the
plaintiffs in chambers that he would not permit
counsel to argue his theory of the case as recited
in plaintiffs' proposed instruction number 19, and
that plaintiffs' counsel would be restricted to
arguing from the precise language of the Court's
instruction number 15.
This motion is based on the records and proceedings in this action, and the affidavit attached
hereto. ·
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGU-M
By /s/ MAx K. MANGUM
Attorneys for Plwintiffs"
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''AFFIDAVIT
Civil No. 163708
STATE OF UTAH
}
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
ss
MAX K. MANGUM, being first sworn upon
his oath deposes and says :
That on June 15, 1967, in chambers of Judge
Merrill Faux, and before the jury had been instructed in the case of DiEnes v. Safeco Life lnsu:ra!IUJe Co., the following took place without a
court reporter being present:
1. The Court advised counsel that he would
not instruct the jury on plaintiffs' theory of the
law, and that plaintiffs' requested instructions
numbered 16, 17, 18 and 19 would not be given.

2. The Court advised counsel that he would
not give defendant's requested instructions numbered 6 or 7.
3. The Court advised counsel that he would remain neutral on the construction of the language
of the policy, and would therefore instruct the
jury by using the precise language of the policy,
which was done by the court's instruction No. 15.
4. The Court in response to a direct question
from affiant whether affiant would be permitted to
argue his theory of the case as recited in plaintiff's requested instruction number 19, was advised that summation to the jury must be restricted to the language of the court's instructions.
Counsel for the defendant, nevertheless, stated to
the jury on two separate occasions that plaintiffs
could not recover unless they proved that the
death of Mr. DiEnes was solely the result of injuries effected through external, violent and accidental means. Despite objection by plaintiffs'
9

counsel, the Court did not admonish counsel for
the defendant, nor did he instruct the jury to
disregard such statements.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
/s/ MAx K. MANGUM

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd
day of June, 1967.
/s/ JANE ROBERTS

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City,
Utah.''

My commission expires :
April 9, 1969
"AFFIDAVIT
Civil No. 163708
STATE OF UTAH
}
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
ss
REX J. HANSON being first duly sworn deposes and says:
That on June 15, 1967, before the jury was
instructed, the court's proposed instructions were
discussed between Court and counsel in chambers.
Counsel for plaintiffs contended that the insuring
agreement of the insurance policy was ambiguous
in that the words ''effected solely through external, violent and accidental means'' could reasonably be construed rto apply to injuries sustained
by the insured and not his death. The court was
of the opinion that the proYision was not ambiguous and stated that he would instruct the jury
using said words in the insuring agreement. 'rlw
court advised plaintiffs' counsel that he would
10

not permit him to argue that the insuring agreement was ambiguous and that in his argument to
the jury, plaintiffs' counsel would he governed by
the law as stated in the court's instructions. Affiant does not recall and therefore denies that the
court said he would remain neutral in the matter
except that the court did say that he would not instruct the jury on the legal theory of either counsel, but would instruct the jury in accordance with
the wording of the insurance policy. After the discussion, the Reporter was called into chambers
and both counsel took some exceptions to the
court's proposed instructions reserving the right
to take additional exceptions after the jury had
retired.
In summation to the jury, affiant read the
court's Instruction No. 15, and stated to the jury
that plaintiffs could not recO\'er unless they had
proved that the death of DiEnes resulted solely
from injuries effected through external, violent
and accidental means, which was objected to by
counsel for the plaintiffs but no request was made
to the court to admonish the jury or for a mistrial. It is affiant 's position that his statement to
the jury was supported by the evidence and in
accordance with the law given in the Instructions.
Is/ REX J. HANSON
REX J. HANSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th
day of July, 1967.
/s/ DIANE M. MARTIN
Notary Public - Residing
at Salt Lake City, Utah
1\Iy Commission Expires August 17, 1969."
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VI
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
UNDER THE INSURING LANGUAGE OF
THE DIENES POLICY, INSURED'S DEATH
NEED NOT HAVE RESULTED SOLELY
FROM THE INJURIES INCURRED BY EXTERNAL, VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL
MEANS, BUT MUST HAVE OCCURRED AS
A RESULT OF THESE IN JURIES IN ORDER
FOR APPELLANTS TO RECOVER.
Respondent took the position throughout the trial
that appellants could not recover since decedent's heart
disease was at least a contributing cause of his death. To
restate the same proposition, respondent always insisted
that appellants had to prove that the death of Mr.
DiEnes resulted solely from injuries effected through external, violent and accidental means in order to recover.
Appellants contend that they may recover if Mr. DiEnes'
death occurred as a result of injuries effected solely
through external violent and accidental means. This difference is the whole crux of the case. Appellants concede without argument that the evidence conclusively
shows that the diseased heart of Mr. DiEnes was a concurring cause of his death, but we deny the obligation to
prove that his death was the sole result of the injuries. If
appellants are wrong on this issue, your opinion should
dismiss our appeal.
On the other hand, if we are right on this point, then
the lower court committed reversihle error by refusing
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to properly instruct the jury on appellant's theory of the
law of this case.
The accidental death and dismemberment clauses in
the policy read as follows insofar as they are applicable
to the issues in this case:
"ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT
BENEFITS - Subject to the exclusion, if any employee, while insured by this policy and prior to
retirement, sustains bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means,
and as a result thereof, suffers within 90 days one
of the following losses, Lifeco Insurance Company of America will pay the applicable amount
specified in the Schedule of Insurance for Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance, or
one-half such amount, as indicated:

1. For loss of life, the full amount;

It is significant to note that the controlling language
of this policy simply requires that bodily injuries sustained solely through external, violent and accidental
means must be present. The policy does not require that
death, the result of bodily injuries, be solely due to the
accident but instead merely provides that as a result of
the accidental bodily injuries, if death ensues, the liability follows. Thus, the first real question to be determined is whether the injuries or the death must be solely
attributable to accidental means. It should be kept in
mind that in case of doubt because of the language used
in the policy, the doubt must he resolved against the insurance carrier and in favor of the insured.
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A case which discussed this distinction aml which
recognized that la11guage similar to the language in this
case requires only that the bodily injuries be sustained
solely through accidental means is Standard Li/ e lnsura~ice Company v. Foster (1950), 210 Miss. 242, 49 S.2d
391. Foster sustained injuries by being struck by a m-0tor vehicle on November 18, sustaining a fractured ankle
and multiple rib fractures. He died on the following
Dec. 1. The attending physician's certificate filed with
the Bureau of Vital Statistics, and received in evidence
as prima facie proof of the facts therein recited, listed
the fractures and also stated that the death was "not
due to external causes." Defendant contended insured
died of epilepsy.

The insurance policy language involved in the Foster case reads that the insurance company ''hereby insures the person named in the policy against the result
of bodily injuries received during the time this policy is
in force, and affected solely by external violent and
accidental means.''
The unanimous decision by the Chief Justice of the
Mississippi Supreme Court is so clear on the precise
dispute now before this court that we quote from this
decision:
''Therefore, under the foregoing testimony we
are of the opinion that it was a question for the
jury as to whether or not the death of the insured
was the proximate result of bodily injuries, which
were effected solely hy external violent and accidental means. In fact, there could be no question
but that the bodily injuries ~were received and ef14

fected solely by external, violent and accidental
means, and if there is any doubt as to whether
the provision of the policy means that the bodily
injuries must be effected solely by external, violent and accidental means, instead of meaning
that the death must be effected solely by such
means, then the doubt would have to be resolved
in favor of the insured * * * '' 49 So. 2d at 395.
(Emphasis added)
The Mississippi court then points out the different
result which will follow when policy language is used
which insures against the effects resulting directly and
e.r.:dusively of all other causes from bodily injury sustained solely through accidental means. (Compare with
the language used in the policy in the Tucker case (Utah)
discussed at page 20 herein.)
The Mississippi court concluded that the insurance
clause in the Foster case (language almost identical to
the instant case) only requires that the bodily injuries
shall be received and effected solely by external, Yiolent
and accidental means and that the death must occur
as a result thereof.
It should be pointed out that the DiEnes policy does
not provide, as it could by the choice of the insurer, that
the liability is excluded if death was caused or contrib1tfed to directly or indirectly or wholly or partially by
disease or by bodily infirmity.
rl'his court has held that an insurance policy, while
it is a written contract, is not one which is negotiated
lictween the parties. These policy contracts are prepared
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in advance by the insurance company. This court has held
that there must be a liberal construction of all the terms
in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for
which the insurance was taken out and for which the premium was paid. See Browning v. Equitablr Life Assurarnce Society, 72 P.2<l 1060, 94 Ut. 532, and see written
opinion denying the rehearing, which is reported in 80
P.2d 349, 94 Ut. 570.
Respondents will undoubtedly place reliance upon
the exclusionary clause in the DiEnes policy, but again
it should be noted that the clause simply provides that no
benefits under this accidental death and dismemberment
provision shall be paid for accidental death or dismemberment caused by disease or bodily or mental infirmity. The authors of the policy could very easily have provided in the exclusionary clause that liability is excluded
if death was caused or contributed to directly or indirectly or icholly or partially by disease or by bodily i11firmity. They did not elect to use this type of exclusionary language and they cannot, theorefore, at this point
be permitted to assert that the sanw results can he
achieved by a forced construction of the language which
they did use. Furthermore, the exclusionary clause cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to completely
negate the language of the insuring clause. The two
clauses must be construed as a whole, not piecemeal.
There are, of course, hundreds of cases construing
insurance policies and many courts have allowed reeovery even though there is a diseased or bodily infirmit~'
present where an accidental injur~' triggers or influences
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or controls the conditions which existed at the time of
the injury and which set in motion the prior disease or
bodily infirmity so that death ensues. Recovery has been
allowed in many cases notwithstanding the fact that a
pre-existing disease has contributed to the death. Again
the controlling point is the language used by the authors
of the policy.
This court in Browning held that when a diseased condition is set in motion as the result of an injury, the disability or death is deemed the proximate result of the injury and not of the disease as an independent cause. The
intervening cause which follows as a natural, though not
necessary, consequence of accidental injury, cannot, therefore, be considered an independent cause. The court in
Browning pointed out that an intervening cause set in
motion by accidental injury is a result of the accident and
not au independent cause. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in Griff·in, v. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Ut. 563,
133 P.2d 333, at 339, adopted this same view of the law.
The DiEnes policy clause before the Court in this
case does not provide that recovery shall be had only if
110 other circumstance than the accident contributes to the
<leath either proximately or remotely, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part. This court in the Browning
case recognized this legal point and commented on the
problem of language choice as it affects the legal results.
In Brownin_q, this court also said that when an insured claims a right to recover under the accident pro-
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visions of a policy (accidental death clause) all he need
do is bring himself within the field therein defined and
show that the injury was proximately eansed through
violent, external and accidental means. He is not required to show that there were 110 latent causes or other
conditions which might have contributed to the result,
indirectly or in part. When he brings himself within the
insuring clause he has made his case and any exceptions, exclusions or conditions "·hich would then deny
him relief are matters of defense mid the burden thereof rests upon the insurer.
Broicning also noted that in a case starting with bodily injury all morbid changes in the exercise of vital functions which result from or are induced by such injury
should be regarded as the effect thereof and not as an
independent cause. When death results from such morbid change so resulting from or inducrd by such injury,
the injury and not the morbid change indured by it is the
cause of death. Beginning with a primary cause conditions induced by such cause are e>fforts thereof and every
condition so induced must be corn:;idNed in relation

thereto as an effect and not a ca use.
Interpreting these points made in the B nncning case.
if the acute coronary insufficiency, 'vhich was the immediate cause of Mr. DiEnes' death, was set in motion b:·
the accident or if the coronary insufficiency was controlled, directed or influenced in its action or behavior
by the accident, then the coronary insufficiency was a result of the aceident and not an i11<1epe11dent cause of
death.
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In Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 82 P.2d 178, 95
Ut. 445, Justice Wolfe recognized the "thin skull" rule
as operative in Utah. He said the "insurer takes the insured 'as is' and if the accident by operating on that
particular person actually set in motion causes which
would not have been set in motion in a normal person
but which produced the final result, it is a reasonable
construction of the policy to hold that the accident was
the direct and only cause of the final result."
In the Lee case, Lee had been suffering from gall
bladder trouble which had apparently become dormant.
Lee suffered a severe blow which ruptured the gall bladder, infection followed, and then death. The policy paid
double indemnity if death of the insured resulted "directly and independently of
other cwuse from bodily
injury effected solely through external violent and accidental causes." (emphasis added) The opinion of the
court held ''that where an accidental injury sets in motion or starts activity of a latent or dormant disease
and such disease contributes to the death after having
been so precipitated by the accident, the disease is not a
direct or indirect cause of death, nor a contributing cause
within the meaning of the policy, but the accident which
started the mischief and precipitated the condition resulting in death is the sole cause of death."

au

We repeat that there is no language in the DiEnes
policy that if death results directly a<nd independently of
all other causes from bodily injuries then and only then
is the insurer liable. Thus appellants' burden in this case
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is not so onerous as plaintiff had in the Lee case, where
plaintiff prevailed despite the stringent policy language.
Another Utah case is worthy of comment in this
brief. We refer to Tucker v. New York Life lnBurancc
Company, 107 Utah 478, 155 P.2d 173. The poliey language in the Tucker case reads "New York Life Insurance Company agrees to pay to the beneficiaries $1,000,
the face of this policy, upon reeeipt of due proof of the
dea:th of Garber M. Nichols, the insured; or double the
face of this policy upon receipt of due proof that the
death of the insured resulted directly and independently
of all other causes from bodily injury affected solely
through external, violent and accidental ca.use, and that
such death occurred within 60 days after sustaining such
injury." (Emphasis added) The exclusion clause of this
policy reads: ''This double irtdemnity benefit will not
apply if the insured 's death resulted from physical or
mental infirmities; or directly or indirectly from illness
or disease of any kind.'' The evidence in the Tucker case
clearly showed that the accident set in motion forces
which increased the blood pressure of the deceased which,
working on a pathological condition, to-wit: a weakened
main artery because of prolonged high blood pressure,
caused his death. The ruling of the court was obviously
controlled by the policy language which paid the double
indemnity amo1mt only if the death resulted directly and
independently of all other causes from the bodily injury.
Since the death in the Tucker case resulted from a combination of circumstances, the policy language prevented
payment. Again we repeat, therp, is no requirement in
20

the DiEnes policy that death result directly a;nd independently of all other clllUSes from the injuries or accide11.t. Certainly, Titcker should not control this case as
the policy language there was radically different. It is
ne,·ertheless interesting and at the same time disturbing
to note that the lower court felt that the Tucker case was
controlling and that the language was different without
any real distinction in a reasonable interpretation of·it.
(R-128)

Another Utah ca.se which discusses some of the problems which are present in this case is Griffin v. Pruden~
ti.al Insurance Compamy, 102 Ut. 563, 133 P.2d 333.
Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion cites cases
which establish that the true question is whether the
deceased would have died at the time he did die if
he ha.d not received the injuries in the auto accident. The
mere fact that the auto accident hastened death by aggravating a heart condition so that deceased only lived a
few hours when, even if he had not had the auto accident and consequent injuries, he might not have lived as
much as a month, would not defeat recovery under the
language of the DiEnes policy. If the coronary ins~f
ficieney which Mr. DiEnes suffered was a result of the
auto aceident injuries, even though Mr. DiEnes had a diseased heart, recovery may be had under the language of
this policy. The Griff·in case also made clear the fact that
the insurer has burden of proof that death was c.aused
by exceptions to the risk insured against. Thus, if the
defendant el aims that death was within the exclusion
dause, then the defendant has the burden of proving this
with a preponderance of the evidence.
21

Dr. Curtis, a fully qualified lwart specialist who
never did testify that he ever saw or treated Mr. DiEues,
but who merely reviewed the written medical hospital
and autopsy reports of Mr. DiEnes, was the only expert
witness who testified that the accidental injuries had no
connection with the death of Mr. DiEnes (R-116, 125).
Nevertheless, Dr. Curtis was not prepared to predict Mr.
DiEnes' life expectancy at the time of the accident, although he did say that Mr. DiEnes had already lived
longer than one would expect ( R-125). Dr. Curtis did
testify that anxiety such as Mr. DiEnes had was a factor
in his heart problem, and that it could be a precipitating
factor to bring on a second, third or fourth heart problem (R. 124, 125). Dr. Curtis, who never knew or treated Mr. DiEnes, and who did not participate in the autopsy, nevertheless expressed his opinion (not supported
by the other experts whose information 'vent far beyond
a mere revie~w of a paper record) that anxiety from the
auto accident was not a factor in l\Ir. DiEnes' death.
Under appellants' theory of the law of this case, Dr.
Curtis' testimony at most made a jury question as to
whether Mr. DiEnes died as a result of the accidental
injuries. However, we point out again that under the
ruling of the court we were forbidden to argue our theory
of the law as it would apply to Dr. Curtis' testimony.

POINT 2
THE LOWER COURT OONIMITTED REVERSIBLE ]JRROR BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON APPl<JLLANTS'
THEORY OF THI~ LA Vv OF THIS CASE.
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Appellants took exception to the refusal of the court
to give their requested instructions numbered 16, 17, 18
and 19. Appellants also took exception to instruction No.
15 as given by the court.
Appellants' requested instructions numbered 16, 17,
18 and 19 as submitted to the lower court were as follows:
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16
''You are instructed that from the undisputed
testimony in this case Mr. DiEnes did in fact suffer an acute coronary insufficiency on August 5,
1965, which was the immediate cause of his death.
You must determine by a preponderance of the
evidence whether the acute coronary insufficiency
was set in motion by accidental injuries sustained
by Mr. DiEnes, or whether the acute coronary insufficiency was controlled, directed or influenced
in its action or behavior by accidental injuries
sustained by Mr. DiEnes. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acute coronary insufficiency was set in motion, controlled, directed or influenced by accidental injuries to Mr.
DiEnes, then you may find that the coronary insufficiency and death were a result of the accident,
and not the independent cause of the death of
Mr. DiEnes."
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 17
''Starting with a bodily injury, all morbid
changes in the exercise of vital functions which result from or are induced by such injury should be
regarded as the effect thereof and not as independent causes. \Vhen death results from any
such morbid change so resulting from or induced
by such injury, the injury and not the morbid
change induced by it, is the cause of death. Be-
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ginning with a primary cause, conditions induced
by such cause and effects thereof, and every condition so induced must be considered in relation
thereto as an effect and not as a cause.''
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 18
"You are instructed that when an insurance
company insures the life of an individual with an
accidental double indemnity policy, that the insurance company takes that individual 'as he is.'
If an accident by operating on that particular insured individual actually sets in motion causes
which would not have been set in motion in a normal person but which, nevertheless, resulted in
the death of the insured, it is a reasonable construction of the policy to hold that the death was
the direct result of the accident."
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 19
"You are instructed that under the terms of
the policy involved in this case, the deceased, Mr.
DiEncs, must have:
1. Sustained bodily injuries effected solely
through extenial violent and accidental means in
order to recover, and
2. As a result of such injuries, his death must
have occurred within ninety days.
The death need not have resulted solely from
the injuries incurred by external, violent and acci
dental means, but must have occurred as a result
of these injuries in order for plaintiffs to recover."
Instruction number 15 as given by the court was as
follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
''In order to prove the essential elements of
plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them to es tab24

lish by a preponderance of the evidence in the
case the following proposition: That the death
of Louis DiEnes was a result of bodily injuries
effected solely through external, violent and accidental means.''
Instruction No. 15 ignores the dispute between the
litigants and simply uses the policy language itself. The
court did nothing to clarify the opposite positions taken
by counsel throughout the trial, except that the court directly instructed appellants' counsel in chambers that he
was not at liberty to argue that the insuring agreement
was ambiguous, and in his arguments to the jury,
coWlsel was to be governed by the court's instruction
(R-137, 140).
Despite this, counsel for respondents states that:
"In his summation to the jury affiant read
the court's instruction No. 15, and stated to the
jury that plaintiffs could not recover unless they
had proved that the death of DiEnes resulted
solely from injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means." (R-140 Affidavit of
respondent's counsel filed in connection with appellants' Motion for a New Trial.) (Emphasis
added)
Objection was made to these remarks at the very
time they were uttered, but the court did not admonish
counsel nor instruct the jury to disregard such comments (R-138).
At no time throughout the entire trial was coWlsel
for appellants ever permitted to state in the presence of
the jury, that appellants were entitled to :recover if
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death resulted from a combination of factors, or that
the death of Mr. DiEnes need not have resulted solely
from injuries incurred in the accident. Appellants were
forced to try the case and argue to the jury on the premise of the trial court that if the heart condition of Mr.
DiEnes was a contributing factor in his death, then appellants eould not recover (R-100).
In the absence of the right to discuss this matter
with the jury, it was obvious that they could only reach
one verdict, ''no cause of action. '' The evidence conclusively showed that Mr. DiEnes' diseased heart was a
concurring cause of his death. Unless appellants were
accorded the right to argue their construction of the insurance policy language, they never had a chance to prevail. This, we say, was reversible error.
There can be no dispute that Mr. DiEnes sustained
"bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means'' (the precise language of the policy, Exhibit 1-P). Nevertheless, the court refused to so
instruct the jury despite a specific request to do so
(R-131). Appellants requested the court to preface its
instruction No. 15 with the statement that there is no
dispute about the fact that Mr. DiEnes suffered bodily
injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. An exception was taken to this refusal by
the court (R-131).
Under the authorities cited and discussed in pages
12 to 22 herein, appellants' theor~- of the law should
have been given as requested in instructions 16, 17, 18
and particularly number 19.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants believe that their requested instruction
No. 19 sums up their entire contentions in this case and
we therefore close this brief by again quoting this requested instruction:

PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 19
"You are instructed that under the terms of
the policy involved in this case, the deceased, Mr.
DiEnes, must have:
1. Sustained bodily injuries effected solely
through external violent and accidental means in
order to recover, and

2. As a result of such injuries, his death must
have occurred within ninety days.
The death need not have resulted solely from
the injuries incurred by external, violent and accidental means, but must have occurred as a result
of these injuries in order for plaintiffs to recover."
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUM
By 1\fax K. MANGUM
Attorneys for Plain.tiffsA ppella;n.ts

27

